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Abstract 
This paper investigates the long-run and short-run determinants of financial euroization 
(FE) using both linear and threshold models. We model deposit euroization (DE) and 
credit euroization (CE) in Croatia, a post-transition country recording very high and 
persistent unofficial FE. The results suggest that only the portfolio view is important for 
explaining DE and CE. The market failure view does not seem to matter for FE in Croa-
tia. Both nominal and real exchange rate changes have a strong effect on FE in the long 
run; the former is more important for DE and the latter for CE. In the short and long run 
CE is also determined by matching behavior of banks’ foreign currency positions. Both 
DE and CE respond to changes in inflation and exchange rate volatility. Threshold coin-
tegration confirms that FE determination is subject to significant threshold effects, while 
error correction models suggest that FE adjustment is very slow and asymmetric, partly 
due to very strong FE persistence. 
1. Introduction 
The origins of unofficial financial euroization (FE) in most post-transition Euro-
pean countries can be traced back as far as the 1980s. In spite of the economic and 
political stability, strong growth performance, and increased central bank credibility 
witnessed in the last 15 years, the incidence of FE has persisted in most post-transi-
tion European countries. The exchange rate depreciation experienced in some countries 
during the economic downturn in 2009 showed just how dangerous it is to under-
estimate the  pervasiveness of FE. To that end, the  EBRD in its latest Transition 
Report for 2010 cites FE as one of the major weaknesses of post-transition European 
countries that needs to be tackled in order to achieve stable and sustainable growth in 
the future (EBRD, 2010).  
Policy makers in post-transition economies acceding to the EU did not insist 
on financial system de-euroization owing to the assumption that euro adoption was 
imminent, which in turn implied that FE was a temporary phenomenon.
1 Moreover, 
since the  banking systems of post-transition countries consisted mostly of banks 
owned by parent banks from the Eurozone, FE was considered a natural extension of 
the financial integration process. 
* The authors are grateful to two anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions. All remaining 
errors are ours. 
1 One must note, however, that due to a high level of public debt, euro adoption cannot be considered an exit 
option for those new EU member states and candidate countries whose public debt level has approached or 
surpassed the Maastricht criteria. Moreover, the authorities in these countries focused rather on restricting
borrowing in foreign currencies, while saving in foreign currencies was generally very limited.  
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However, since the global economic crisis shook the economies of the region 
it has become increasingly obvious that the adverse effects of FE as well as the limits 
it imposes on policymakers were perhaps somewhat underestimated. Large exchange 
rate depreciation in euroized countries can not only affect the stability of the banking 
system, but also deepen or even trigger recession instead of helping the economy to 
recover (Cook, 2004).  
In such a situation, it is clear that more research is needed in order to under-
stand the FE phenomenon in the region and to undertake appropriate policy actions. 
We analyze data for Croatia, one of the post-transition countries characterized by very 
high and persistent FE. We use empirical analysis in order to answer the following 
key questions. First, what drives deposit and credit euroization and are any of the driv-
ers susceptible to policy measures? Second, is FE more elastic to changes in the nomi-
nal or real effective exchange rate (REER)? Third, are deposit and credit euroization 
characterized by threshold effects?  
Besides having direct implications for economic policy, the  results of this 
analysis also contribute to the body of literature in several respects. First, to the best 
of our knowledge, all existing empirical studies on substituting the domestic currency 
with the euro use linear models,
2 although it is well documented that euroization 
(dollarization) increases sharply during episodes of macroeconomic instability and 
that it remains stubbornly high even long after successful stabilizations, thereby im-
plying either asymmetric or threshold effects. In the same vein, it is less likely that 
the level of FE will change if nominal or real effective exchange rate changes are 
small or negative (i.e., if the exchange rate appreciates). The opposite is true for large 
and positive changes of the nominal or real effective exchange rate. Several studies, 
such as Neanidis and Savva (2009) and Rennhack and Nozaki (2006), incorporate 
an index of asymmetric exchange rate movement into a linear econometric frame-
work, which could be considered implicit confirmation of the  existence of a  bias 
toward local-currency depreciation. Moreover, threshold effects may also matter for 
the responses of FE to exchange rate volatility and inflation changes. Therefore, in 
this study, we estimate both linear and threshold models of short-run FE behavior in 
order to determine whether any threshold effects exist, and in which cases linear 
models of FE are appropriate.  
Second, by using separate models we test the  effects of nominal and real 
effective exchange rate changes on FE. Although the portfolio and market failure 
approaches to explaining FE emphasize the REER as the FE determinant, empirical 
papers usually control either for the nominal exchange rate or for REER changes and 
by doing so they neglect to compare which exchange rate has a stronger effect on FE. 
We feel that nominal exchange rate changes might have a stronger effect on FE be-
cause they are more easily observed and thus agents may react more strongly than to 
REER changes. Moreover, the threshold cointegration models used in this paper as-
sume that the adjustment is discrete, or, in other words, all agents adjust to long-run 
discrepancies in the level of euroization at the same time. The observability of the nom-
inal exchange rate facilitates discrete adjustment, thus making the nominal exchange 
rate more suited for the threshold cointegration model as compared to the REER. 
2 The notable exception is Heimonen (2001), who focuses on substitution of a substitute currency, while 
we are interested in financial euroization.   
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Finally, unlike other empirical studies on FE for post-transition European countries, 
our analysis includes the period of the latest economic downturn, which coincided 
with an intensive FE upswing. Hence, the inclusion of the newest observations may 
add relevant information content to the empirical model and consequently provide 
new insights into FE behavior. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the em-
pirical literature on FE, giving special attention to the  results for European post- 
-transition countries and Croatia. The third section presents a brief overview of FE in 
Croatia. The fourth section discusses the methodology applied, the data, and the re-
sults of the empirical analysis, while section 5 concludes the paper.  
2. Literature Review 
The term euroization (or dollarization) refers to a variety of cases in which 
a domestic currency is to a certain degree substituted by a foreign currency. While 
official euroization implies legally approved foreign currency use for all money func-
tions, unofficial euroization represents a situation in which both the domestic and 
foreign currency are used simultaneously but the foreign currency is not legal tender. 
Unofficial euroization comes in different forms: currency substitution (the foreign 
currency takes on the medium of exchange function), asset substitution (the foreign 
currency takes on the store of value and unit of account functions) and real euro-
ization (the foreign currency is used for denomination of prices and wages). Instead 
of asset substitution, during the last decade the literature coined the term financial 
euroization (FE), further divided into deposit and credit euroization. Deposit euro-
ization (DE) is the propensity of households, enterprises, and even governments to 
hold deposits in foreign currency, while credit euroization (CE) is the propensity of 
commercial banks to approve loans either in foreign currency or indexed to foreign 
currency.  
The early literature on dollarization in Latin America focuses primarily on 
currency substitution and its repercussions for conducting monetary policy. Currency 
substitution is thus explained through a  negative correlation between demand for 
local currency and the rate of inflation (Savastano, 1996). Levy Yeyati (2006) out-
lines three main paradigms in modern theoretical analysis of FE. The portfolio view 
explains FE as an outcome of decisions on an optimal (minimum variance) portfolio 
given the real returns on different currencies. Returns on local currency assets are 
uncertain due to domestic inflation, while returns on foreign currency assets are un-
certain due to real exchange rate risk (Ize and Levy Yeyati, 2003; Basso, Calvo-Gon-
zales, and Jurgilas, 2007). Since this setting assumes that the uncovered interest rate 
parity holds, the emphasis is placed on variances. Namely, if the variability of do-
mestic inflation increases relative to the real devaluation rate, the local currency be-
comes less attractive and the FE ratio rises.  
The market failure view explains FE as a result of optimal decisions by risk 
neutral agents in the presence of default risk (enhanced by moral hazard/asymmetric 
information). If the central bank of an economy characterized by large and sudden 
exchange rate depreciations in the past, insists on a stable exchange rate, moral haz-
ard problems will arise and borrowers and lenders will not fully internalize the risks 
of borrowing (or lending) in foreign currency. Consequently, they benefit from  
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a lower cost (and lower risk) of borrowing and lending in foreign currency, which in 
turn increases the level of FE.  
The institutional view analyzes the presence of FE in relation to the credibility 
of central bank and government policies, i.e., it explains FE as being a result of do-
mestic market and legal imperfections. A weak institutional framework and low credi-
bility of economic policies increase the government’s quest to build up confidence by 
using the exchange rate anchor. Since such dollar- or euro-friendly regulations re-
present a commitment mechanism by which the government or monetary authorities 
borrow credibility and make the cost of a potential depreciation prohibitively high, 
FE becomes the collateral cost of low institutional credibility (Nicoló, Honohan, and 
Ize, 2005; Rajan and Tokatlidis, 2005). 
Several empirical papers focus on FE in post-transition European countries. 
All of them use linear models to control for the behavior of FE, except the study by 
Heimonen (2001). For the case of Estonia, Heimonen (2001) estimates possible port-
folio shifts between two substitute currencies – euros and dollars. He identifies 
the  dynamics of such substitution in both the short and long term using threshold 
cointegration. However, his research does not focus on the determinants of financial 
euroization, nor does it consider substitution between the domestic and foreign cur-
rency. 
By examining foreign currency shortages in dollarized economies, Rajan and 
Tokatlidis (2005) claim that liability dollarization is a response to institutional weak-
nesses and lack of monetary credibility. Moreover, their results indicate that higher 
inflation in the past leads to dollarization strengthening, while the opposite is not true 
when inflation falls, suggesting CE is persistent. Neanidis and Savva (2009) estimate 
a panel of 11 Central and Eastern European (CEE) and Commonwealth of Independ-
ent States (CIS) countries in order to model the short-run determinants of DE and 
CE. In the short run, the negative effects of depreciation and monetary contrac- 
tion are particularly pronounced in countries with high euroization. CE is driven in 
the short run by DE, while both types of euroization are influenced by interest rate 
differentials. Basso, Calvo-Gonzales, and Jurgilas (2007) use an unbalanced panel of 
24CEE and CIS countries in order to explain FE. The results indicate that access to 
foreign funds as well as higher interest rate differentials increase CE but decrease 
DE. Moreover, the tradeoff between inflation and REER volatility is found to be 
a significant factor in explaining FE, thereby proving the validity of the portfolio 
approach. Similar results are confirmed by Rosenberg and Tirpák (2009), who find 
that CE increases together with rising interest rate differentials, foreign funding, and 
openness. Other authors agree that a higher degree of trade openness contributes to 
CE. Luca and Petrova (2008) use aggregate data in a panel of 21 CEE and CIS coun-
tries in order to model CE. Empirical results suggest CE is positively related to in-
terest rate differentials, domestic monetary volatility, and DE, while it is negatively 
related to exchange rate volatility. Moreover, export openness seems to promote CE, 
as export-oriented firms use natural hedges. The authors also show that the presence 
of a deep forward foreign currency market decreases the level of CE. As explored by 
Guscina (2008), financial development, openness, and falling inflation promote govern-
ment debt de-euroization and therefore tend to decrease CE. 
Stix (2010) uses a unique household survey data for Croatia, Slovenia, and 
Slovakia in order to understand the factors driving DE persistence. Probit estimations  
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show that expectations of inflation and exchange rates do not affect DE, while trust 
in the  banking system determines the  choice between foreign currency cash and 
foreign currency deposits. On the other hand, age and level of income and education 
of savers are positively correlated with DE. Brown, Kirschenmann, and Ongena (2009) 
analyze CE in Bulgaria using a unique data set on individual loan contracts of a Bul-
garian bank with small and medium-sized businesses. The results show that Bulgar-
ian firms are more likely to request a foreign currency denominated loan if they have 
foreign exchange revenues and if the requested loan amount is larger and the ma-
turity longer. Higher inflation volatility and interest rate differentials also promote 
demand for foreign currency denominated loans. At the same time, banks seem hesi-
tant to lend long term in local currency and are eager to match the currency structure 
of their assets and liabilities. Moreover, exploring a large sample of small firms from 
a number of emerging market economies, Brown, Ongena, and Yeşin (2009) confirm 
the results of Brown, Kirschenmann, and Ongena (2009) but find that CE is more 
strongly related to foreign currency revenues than to interest rate differentials. Koke-
nyne, Ley, and Veyrune (2010) separately model CE and DE in Croatia in order to 
determine whether prudential regulation has an effect on the level of FE. They find 
that both CE and DE show a moderate response to prudential measures in Croatia. 
Besides prudential measures, CE also reacts to changes in the REER and inflation, 
while DE seems to be characterized by a high degree of persistence. 
3. Financial Euroization in Croatia 
The Croatian financial system is characterized by a very high and persistent 
level of euroization. Judging from data on DE and CE collected both by Luca and 
Petrova (2008) and by Levy Yeyati (2006), Croatia is (together with Armenia and 
Georgia) by far the most financially euroized country in Europe. Moreover, once 
Croatia joins the EU (which can be expected during 2013 or 2014), it will become 
the EU member state with the most pervasive FE. The main features of FE in Croatia 
include the use of the euro as a unit of account and store of value, a very high level of 
both DE and CE, less pronounced currency mismatches on commercial banks’ bal-
ance sheets, and very pronounced currency mismatches on the balance sheets of non- 
-tradable business sectors and households. Similar features can also be identified in 
other Western Balkan countries (Serbia, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Albania), some CIS 
countries (Armenia and Georgia), and to a smaller degree in two Baltic countries, 
Latvia and Lithuania. On the contrary, in many Central and Eastern European coun-
tries DE is much less pronounced, loans are indexed also to CHF and JPY, and com-
mercial banks’ exposure to currency mismatches is much more pronounced. 
Euroization of the Croatian financial system first appeared in the 1980s during 
the period when Croatia was a part of the former Yugoslavia. It emerged due to hyper-
inflation, several sharp devaluations of the domestic currency as well as due to the gen-
eral instability of the domestic banking system.
3 The emergence of euroization was 
supported also by a significant inflow of workers’ remittances and high tourism rev-
enues, both in foreign currency. In the first few years of the 1990s, the Croatian 
economy was stricken by war and by a transition recession that further destabiliz- 
ed the financial system. Economical stagnation in combination with hyperinflation 
 
3 At the time, the Deutsche Mark was used to substitute for the domestic currency, not the euro.  
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Figure 1  Financial Euroization in Croatia 
 
Source for original data: Croatian National Bank 
 
amounting to 1,616 percent annually in 1993 resulted in erosion of the credibility of 
economic policies and caused additional distrust in the domestic currency. In spite  
of the successful implementation of a stabilization program in October 1993 and low 
inflation rates in later years, general confidence in the domestic currency has not been 
established. The domestic currency has never fully assumed its unit of account func-
tion, while the store of value function was mostly reserved for the Deutsche Mark 
and later the euro (Vizek, 2006). Consequently, both deposit and credit euroization 
have remained a  permanent characteristic of the  financial system, although their 
levels have varied somewhat over the years.  
In the period from 1994 to 2000, DE was particularly high, with the ratio of 
foreign currency deposits to total deposits fluctuating between 85 and 90 percent. 
This was a consequence of macroeconomic instability during 1993, compounded by 
a banking crisis, a brief economic downturn, and increasing depreciation pressures on 
the nominal exchange rate in the 1998–1999 period. See Figure 1. 
After 2000, DE leveled off and gradually descended to the 65 percent record-
ed during 2006–2008. A prolonged period of macroeconomic stability and increasing 
monetary policy credibility, higher interest rates on domestic currency deposits, and 
appreciation of the domestic currency contributed most to such movements. Along 
with deposit euroization, credit euroization also trended downwards, as evident in 
the data gathered since 1999. Starting from 2000, when foreign currency denomi-
nated loans amounted to 85 percent of total loans, the level of CE started to subside, 
reaching its bottom during 2008 at around 60 percent. After the global financial crisis 
erupted and macroeconomic instability increased, the  downward trends in deposit 
and credit euroization both reversed, suggesting that credibility of the domestic cur-
rency and monetary authorities was never truly established. 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1. Methodology 
The aim of the econometric analysis is to model the long-run and short-run 
behavior of DE and CE. Therefore, we use both the linear approach (the Johansen co-
integration and vector error correction model) and the threshold approach (the Engle- 
-Granger threshold cointegration and threshold error correction model). Each aspect  
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of financial euroization (DE and CE) is modeled with two models with the same 
endogenous variables, except for a variable that proxies the exchange rate. As ex-
plained in the introduction, we use two exchange rate proxies: the REER and the nomi-
nal exchange rate of the domestic currency against the euro.  
The following general-to-specific modeling strategy is employed: first, we esti-
mate the model for both DE and CE with the largest number of potential determinants 
and test for Johansen cointegration in order to obtain a long-run equilibrium relation-
ship between euroization and its determinants. If no cointegration is found, we reduce 
the model by one variable and test again for cointegration. Once a linear long-run re-
lationship is found, we test for threshold cointegration. If threshold cointegration is 
established, we continue with the estimation of the threshold error correction model 
of DE and CE. If no threshold cointegration is found, we estimate a vector error cor-
rection model of DE and CE in order to model the short-run behavior of financial 
euroization.  
We continue with the exercise by further reducing the number of exogenous 
variables until we find a significant threshold cointegration relationship and derive 
a threshold error correction model. The results of this exercise will show that Johan-
sen cointegration is detectable in relatively large models for which no threshold ef-
fects are discovered. On the other hand, threshold effects are present in relatively 
parsimonious models of DE and CE. 
For the Johansen cointegration test, we use finite sample corrections of trace 
and max statistics (Cheung and Lai, 1993) instead of original test statistics (Johansen, 
1988; Johansen, 1991), mainly because trace and max statistics tend to detect cointe-
gration more often in finite samples when the models include a large number of 
variables and lags.  
In order to detect threshold cointegration in the behavior of FE in Croatia, we 
use a threshold cointegration method developed by Enders and Siklos (2001) by extend-
ing the  generalized threshold autoregressive (TAR) and momentum-TAR (M-TAR) 
tests for unit roots.
4  
The model used for testing threshold cointegration has the following specifi-
cation: 
                                        ( ) 11 21 Δ 1              1,2 tj t t j t t t II j μρ μ ρ μ ε −− =+ − + =              (1) 
where  t μ  is the disturbance term of the Engle-Granger long-run model, while  1t I  and 
2t I  are the Heaviside indicator functions for the TAR and the M-TAR models, respec-
tively, such that: 
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4 More details about the TAR and M-TAR models can be found in Tong (1983), Caner and Hansen (2001),
and Enders and Siklos (2001).  
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in the M-TAR case.  1 τ  and  2 τ  are the values of the threshold and  t ε  is a sequence of 
IID random variables with mean zero and constant variance. The threshold τ  is either 
set to zero or determined endogenously using an algorithm developed by Chan (1993). 
In each of the four cases, depending on the type of asymmetry under consideration 
() 12  or   tt I I  and on the value of the threshold, we estimate the regression equation (1) 
and test the null hypotheses  0 i ρ =  and  12 0 ρ ρ = = , which are direct tests of the ex-
istence of cointegration.
5 The empirical F statistics obtained from the latter test are 
compared to the critical values tabulated by Wade, Gilbert, and Dibooglu (2004).
6 
Finally, we test the null hypothesis  12 ρ ρ =  using the Wald test in order to determine 
whether the cointegration relationship is characterized by threshold effects.
7  
4.2 Data 
Data for the DE model are available at monthly frequency from January 1997 
to May 2010. As a proxy for DE, we use the share of foreign currency deposits in total 
deposits. Apart from the standard variables used in this kind of empirical exercise as 
possible DE determinants, such as the nominal exchange rate, the REER, exchange 
rate volatility (calculated as the standard deviation of the daily exchange rates in 
a given month), CPI inflation, the M1 monetary aggregate, and the share of M4 in M1 
(a variable representing financial system development), we also use three variables 
suggested by the main paradigms in the theoretical analysis of FE. The first variable 
is the past rate of inflation suggested by the currency substitution view (Savastano, 
1996), where past inflation in the contemporaneous period is calculated as average 
inflation over the 24 months (in the case of DE models) or 8 quarters (in the case of 
CE models) prior to the contemporaneous period. The second variable is the mini-
mum variance portfolio (MVP) suggested by the portfolio view (Ize and Levy Yeya-
ti, 2003), which measures the euro share of the MVP calculated from historical 
inflation and real depreciation rates. The third variable represents the market failure 
view (Levy Yeyati, 2006) and measures the correlation between the probability of 
default and the REER. The more procyclical the REER, the stronger the euroization 
bias. Levy Yeyati (2006) proxied the probability of default by real GDP growth, but 
since we need observations at monthly frequency we use industrial production growth, 
which in Croatia is closely correlated to GDP changes. 
Data for the CE model are available at quarterly frequency from the third quar-
ter of 1999 to the second quarter of 2010. As a proxy for CE, we use the share of 
foreign currency loans and loans indexed to foreign currency in total loans. Besides 
using all the endogenous variables already specified above as potential DE deter-
minants, we also use total bank foreign debt and the share of foreign currency de-
posits in total deposits as additional CE determinants representing commercial banks’ 
5 For the tests, we used the larger of the t values and F statistics, which were later denoted by Tmax and 
Φ  both in the text and in the corresponding tables. 
6 The complete table with critical values tabulated by Wade, Gilbert, and Dibooglu (2004) is provided in 
the Appendix. 
7 The null hypothesis assumes linearity, while the alternative assumes threshold behavior. Test statistics are
denoted by W both in the text and in the corresponding tables.  
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foreign currency funding sources and consequent matching behavior of banks’ for-
eign currency positions. All the variables are seasonally adjusted using the X12ARIMA 
method and are in logarithms. ADF unit root test results suggest that all the variables 
are stationary in first differences.
8 A more detailed description of the variables and 
their sources can be found in the Appendix.  
4.3 Results 
The Johansen cointegration tests suggested that the following variables are 
cointegrated with DE: the exchange rate (nominal or REER), exchange rate volatility, 
the minimum variance portfolio, monetary aggregate M1, and inflation. The long-run 
model of CE includes the exchange rate (nominal or REER), exchange rate volatility, 
the minimum variance portfolio, bank foreign debt, deposit euroization, the share of 
M4 in M1, and average past inflation.
9  
Unrestricted and restricted long-run coefficients, together with related ad-
justment parameters are reported in Table 1 for the DE model and in Table 2 for 
the  CE model. The  results of the  individual zero restrictions on the  cointegrating 
parameters suggest that none of the variables displayed in Table 1 can be excluded 
from the long-run equilibrium relationship. Since we found one cointegration vector, 
we need only one restriction per model to be able to identify the long-run coefficients 
and adjustment parameters. However, we introduce a greater number of restrictions 
in order to add more information content to the system. In the long-run DE model 
with the REER as a proxy for the exchange rate, we restrict the long-run coefficient 
for the REER to be equal to -1. In addition, we impose weak exogeneity of DE and 
exchange rate volatility.
10  
Concerning the DE model with the nominal exchange rate, we do not manage 
to restrict the coefficient for the nominal exchange rate.
11 Since the estimated long- 
-run elasticities of DE to changes in the nominal exchange rate and REER amount to 
2.4 and 1, respectively, we can conclude that depreciation of the nominal exchange 
rate has a much stronger effect on the long-run behavior of DE. Furthermore, in the DE 
model with the nominal exchange rate, we impose the unit elasticity restriction on 
the coefficient for inflation together with weak exogeneity of exchange rate volatility 
and M1. 
The long-run coefficients also suggest that exchange rate volatility and infla-
tion contribute to a rise in DE, while monetary expansion has an effect in the op-
posite direction. The results for M1 are not surprising given that an increase in 
the money supply promotes local currency deposits. Those findings are supported by 
earlier studies.  
Along with the long-run DE models, we also try imposing similar restrictions 
on the CE models. The unit elasticity restriction on the REER coefficient in the CE 
 
8 The unit root test results are not presented in the paper to save space, but can be obtained upon request 
from the authors. 
9 Due to space considerations, the Johansen test results are not presented in the paper, but can be obtained 
upon request from the authors. 
10 Please note that the restrictions relate to long-run coefficients written in vector notation. 
11 The restriction that the long-run coefficient of the nominal exchange rate in a restricted model is equal 
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model is rejected with chi-square equal to 6.01 and an underlying p-value of 0.01. 
We impose weak exogeneity of exchange rate volatility and the ratio of M4 to M1. In 
the CE model with the nominal exchange rate, we restrict the long-run coefficient for 
the  nominal exchange rate to -1 and impose weak exogeneity of exchange rate 
volatility, bank foreign debt, and M4/M1. As is the case for DE, we find a positive 
relationship between CE and both the  nominal and real effective exchange rate, 
suggesting that CE also increases after depreciation. However, contrary to DE, CE 
seems to react more strongly to changes in the REER as compared to the nominal 
exchange rate. Growing exchange rate volatility, bank foreign debt, DE, and average 
past inflation contribute to a rise in CE, while financial system development (repre-
sented by M4/M1) reduces it. 
As a next step, we construct vector error correction models for the four cases 
examined where each case consists of the error correction term derived from the be-
longing restricted cointegration vector. To save space, we present only error correc-
tion models for deposit and credit euroization. All error correction models for DE 
and CE satisfy diagnostic tests and are presented in Table 3. One can notice that 
disequilibria in short-run CE models adjust very slowly, while there seems to be no 
adjustment in the case of DE. Block exclusion restrictions on all lags of the indi-
vidual right-hand side variables suggest that in the short run DE only responds to 
changes in inflation and the  minimum variance portfolio. Moreover, the  results 
suggest that persistence is important for both DE and CE short-run behavior. In 
the CE model with the nominal exchange rate incorporated, changes in DE, bank for-
eign debt, and average past inflation all have an effect on euroization in the short run. 
To sum up the results of the linear models, the portfolio view seems to be im-
portant for explaining both DE and CE in the long run, thus confirming the results of 
Basso, Calvo-Gonzales, and Jurgilas (2007). The market failure view does not seem 
to matter, while the currency substitution view matters only for explaining the be-
havior of CE. Besides the  variables suggested by the  theory, DE in the  long run 
increases as a result of consumer price inflation and nominal and real effective ex-
change rate depreciation. DE is more elastic to changes in the nominal exchange rate 
as compared to REER changes, while the opposite is true for CE. CE also shifts up-
ward after an increase in bank foreign debt and DE, suggesting that bank currency 
matching behavior is very important for long-run CE determination in Croatia. Con-
trary to the results of Luca and Petrova (2008) and Kokenyne, Ley, and Veyrune 
(2010), we find that greater exchange rate volatility promotes both DE and CE. The re-
sults also suggest that monetary expansion promotes local currency deposits, thereby 
confirming the results of Neanidis and Savva (2009). The adjustment is quite slow 
and characterized by a high degree of persistence, thereby supporting the findings of 
Kokenyne, Ley, and Veyrune (2010). The emergence of persistence as an FE driver 
could, however, be a result of the choice of DE and CE proxies. The backward-look-
ing nature of the variables used as proxies (stocks of foreign exchange denominated 
deposits/loans to total deposits/loans) might give rise to persistence tendencies and 
therefore the importance of persistence must be somewhat downplayed. Moreover, in 
the short run both CE and DE react to changes in inflation, but they do not react to 
changes in either the nominal or the real effective exchange rate. DE also responds to 
short-run changes in the MVP, while CE responds to short-run changes in banks’ 
foreign sources of financing, thus supporting the findings of Brown, Kirschenmann, 
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Table 3  Vector Error Correction Models 
















ECT_reert-1  0.02 
[0.44]  -  -0.052 
[0.03]*  - 
ECT_ex t-1 -  0.015 
[0.42]  -  -0.145 
[0.00]** 








A2(L)ΔREERt-1  1.27 
[0.24]  -  -0.435 
[0.08]  - 
A2(L)ΔExchange_ratet-1 -  0.875 
[0.57]  -  0.158 
[0.57] 
A3(L)ΔM_1t-1  1.03 
[0.42] 
0.930 
[0.52]  - - 
A4(L)ΔInflationt-1  2.03 
[0.03]* 
1.82 
[0.06]  - - 








A6(L)ΔDeposit_euroizationt-1  3.05 
[0.002]** 
3.73 
[0.0002]**  -  0.419 
[0.002]** 








A9(L)ΔAverage_past_inflationt-1 -  -  -  4.198 
[0.002]** 




Number of lags  12  12  1  1 
Number of observations  161  161  43  43 
sigma  0.0027 0.0028 0.0066  0.0050 
R^2 0.69  0.67  0.59  0.77 
























Notes: p-values presented in brackets; ** – null hypothesis rejected at 1 percent significance level; * – null 
hypothesis rejected at 5 percent significance level; ECT_reer – error correction term from the restricted 
cointegration vector for deposit euroization with REER as an endogenous variable; ECT_ex – error 
correction term from the restricted cointegration vector for deposit euroization with nominal exchange 
rate as an endogenous variable; lag length chosen according to SBIC – Schwartz Bayesian Infor-
mation Criterion; Ai(L) is the first order polynomial in the lag operator L; statistics corresponding to Ai(L) 
refers to F statistics and associated p-value of block exclusion restriction on all lags of an individual 
variable. 
Source: calculation of the authors 
 
and Ongena (2009), Brown, Ongena, and Yeşin (2009), and Basso, Calvo-Gonzales, 
and Jurgilas (2007). 
As a next step, we test the four Johansen cointegration relationships detected 
for threshold cointegration. Comparing the  test statistics for the  Φ test with 
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Table 4  Threshold Cointegration (Quintvariate Cases) 
Dependent 






















  M-TAR M-TAR M-TAR M-TAR 
Threshold =  0.0054 0.0032 0.0067 0.0046 
ρ1=  -0.205 -0.179 -0.227 -0.246 
ρ2 =  -0.491 -0.536 -0.520 -0.469 
Tmax  -1.70 -1.63 -1.89 -2.02 
Φρ ρ == 12 (0 )   11.496** 14.451*** 12.127** 10.530** 
ρρ = 12 () W   5.81 
   [0.02]** 
9.02 
    [0.00]*** 
5.74 
   [0.02]** 
4.00 
     [0.045]** 








Number of lags  4 4 4 4 
Number  
of observations  43 43 43 43 
Notes:  ρ1  and  ρ2  denote the adjustment parameters; p-values presented in brackets; lag length chosen ac-
cording to SBIC – Schwartz Bayesian Information Criterion; *** – null hypothesis rejected at 1 percent 
significance level; ** – null hypothesis rejected at 5 percent significance level; * – null hypothesis 
rejected at 10 percent significance level. 
Source: calculation of the authors 
 
the critical values tabulated in Wade, Gilbert, and Dibooglu (2004), we conclude that 
there is no evidence of threshold cointegration.
12 Thus, we conclude that the Johan-
sen cointegration and VECM models of DE and CE are well specified and continue 
with testing threshold cointegration on more parsimonious models.  
In the case of CE, we detected threshold cointegration in quintvariate cases, 
while in the case of DE threshold cointegration is present only in bivariate cases. 
Table 4 summarizes the test results for the threshold CE models with five variables. 
Four models with CE as the dependent variable satisfy all the diagnostic tests and 
reject the null of no cointegration and the F test for symmetric adjustment at least at 
the 5% level. The threshold values are positive, similar, and very close to zero for all 
cases that demonstrate asymmetric adjustment of CE to changes in bank foreign debt, 
exchange rate volatility, either inflation or average past inflation, and either the nomi- 
nal or the real effective exchange rate. We proceed by creating threshold error cor-
rection models of CE for the four cases exhibiting threshold cointegration. 
The threshold error correction with the estimated coefficients and associated 
p-values of the  constant term and the  adjustment parameters, the  block exclusion 
restriction test for lagged changes of the  dependent and the  explanatory variables 
with associated F statistics and p-values, together with diagnostic tests, are presented 
in Table 5. 
12 Tables with critical values can be found in Table 2 of the Appendix. The results of the three models 
whose statistics are the closest to establishing threshold cointegration are presented in Table 3 of the Ap-
pendix.  
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Table 5  Threshold EC Model (Quintvariate Cases) – Summary of Estimation Results 



























M-TAR M-TAR M-TAR M-TAR 
Threshold =  0.0054 0.0032 0.0067 0.0046 
























A1(L)ΔREERt-1#  - - -  2.27 
[0.12] 















A3(L)ΔAverage_past_inflationt-1  0.28 
[0.60]  - -  0.26 
[0.62] 
A4(L)ΔInflationt-1 -  -  0.61 
[0.55]  - 
A5(L)ΔBank_foreign_debtt-1 -  0.78 
[0.47] 
1.30 
[0.29]  - 









2   0.68 0.60 0.75 0.71 
Number of lags  
of explanatory variables  2 2 2 2 
Number of observations  43  43  43  43 

















 #numbers represent F statistics and the corresponding p-values of the Granger causality test for the re-
spective variable; p-values are presented in brackets; lag length chosen according to SBIC – Schwartz 
Bayesian Information Criterion; *** – null hypothesis rejected at 1 percent significance level; ** – null 
hypothesis rejected at 5 percent significance level; * – null hypothesis rejected at 10 percent sig-
nificance level. 
Source: calculation of the authors 
 
The first thing one notices is that the dependent variable is not weakly exo-
genous. Moreover, CE adjusts to discrepancies in both regimes, with the adjustment 
being faster when the disequilibrium is above the threshold (true in three out of four 
cases). The adjustment parameters range from -0.266 (in the case of the real effective 
exchange rate) to -0.150 (in the case of the nominal exchange rate), but even with 
the largest adjustment parameter (-0.266) it takes approximately four periods or one 
year to correct the discrepancies. The observed slow adjustment might be explained 
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Table 6  Threshold Cointegration for DE (Bivariate Cases) – Summary of Estimation 
Results 
Dependent variable  Deposit euroization 
Explanatory variable  Nominal 
exchange rate  REER  Exchange rate 
volatility 
Type of test  M-TAR  M-TAR  TAR 
Threshold =  -0.0030  -0.0029  -0.1048 
ρ1 =  -0.017 -0.016 -0.048 
ρ2 =  0.043 0.038 -0.161 
Tmax 3.05  2.78  -1.25 
Φρ ρ == 12 (0 )   8.133** 7.061* 7.970** 
ρρ = 12 () W   14.51 
      [0.00]*** 
12.39 
      [0.00]*** 
3.94 
     [0.047]** 






Number of lags  4  4  1 
Number of observations 161  161  161 
Notes:  ρ1  and  ρ2  denote the adjustment parameters; W denotes the Wald test; p-values presented in brack-
ets; lag length chosen according to SBIC – Schwartz Bayesian Information Criterion; *** – null hypo-
thesis rejected at 1 percent significance level; ** – null hypothesis rejected at 5 percent significance 
level; * – null hypothesis rejected at 10 percent significance level. 
Source: calculation of the authors 
 
by persistence, the presence of which is indicated by the results of Granger causality 
tests for a lagged dependent variable. Since there is persistence in the adjustment 
process, fundamentals take a longer time to react, which in turn prevents the adjust-
ment from unfolding more swiftly or completely. However, as in the case of the VECM, 
the persistence might also be a result of the stock definition of the dependent vari-
able. Concerning the  other CE determinants included in the  threshold models, in 
the short run only the nominal exchange rate has an effect on CE, although this effect 
is marginally significant.  
Table 6 summarizes the test results of the three bivariate DE models for which 
threshold effects were found. These models suggest that DE reacts in the long run to 
the  nominal exchange rate, the  REER, and exchange rate volatility. The  threshold 
values in all three models are negative and very close to zero.  
As a final step, we construct threshold error correction models for the three 
cases exhibiting threshold cointegration, with the results displayed in Table 7. DE 
responds to discrepancies from the equilibrium in all three models. In the model with 
the REER, DE adjusts to discrepancies in both regimes, but the adjustment is faster 
when the  discrepancies are below the  threshold. In the  case with the  nominal ex-
change rate, the adjustment occurs in one regime, when the discrepancies are above 
the  threshold. Significant adjustment parameters are very small and range from   
-0.016 to 0.044, implying that it takes up to two years to correct long-run disequi-
libria. 
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Table 7  Threshold EC Model for DE (Bivariate Cases) – Summary of Estimation 
               Results 
Dependent variable  Deposit euroization 
Explanatory variable  Nominal 
exchange rate  REER  Exchange rate 
volatility 
Type of test  M-TAR  M-TAR  TAR 
Threshold -0.0030  -0.0029  -0.1048 


















A1(L)ΔREERt-1# -  0.99  
[0.47]  - 
A1(L)ΔExchange_ratet-1  0.83 
[0.62]  - - 
A2(L)ΔExchange_rate_volatilityt-1 -  -  1.13 
[0.35] 







2  0.40  0.44  0.36 
Number of lags of explanatory variables  12  12  10 
Number of observations  161  161  161 
AR test  1.20 
[0.31] 
2.04 
    [0.057]* 
0.65 
[0.72] 







#numbers represent F statistics and the corresponding p-values of the Granger causality test for the re-
spective variable; p-values are presented in brackets; lag length chosen according to SBIC – Schwartz 
Bayesian Information Criterion; *** – null hypothesis rejected at 1 percent significance level; ** – null 
hypothesis rejected at 5 percent significance level; * – null hypothesis rejected at 10 percent sig-
nificance level. 
Source: calculation of the authors 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In order to address FE with the appropriate policy measures, it is very impor-
tant to understand its determinants. Namely, if policymakers aiming at de-euroization 
do not understand the process that led to equilibrium FE, with FE sometimes being 
an optimal outcome in an economy characterized by a set of frictions, policy meas-
ures aimed at de-euroization could result in failure and may even have detrimental 
effects on the stability of the financial system. 
The results of the empirical analysis presented in this paper suggest that FE is 
an equilibrium outcome of several factors. Models nested in a linear framework sug-
gest that the exchange rate, exchange rate volatility, inflation, and the tradeoff between 
inflation and real depreciation (suggested by the portfolio view of FE) are important 
for explaining the long-run behavior of both DE and CE. In addition, CE is affected 
in the long run by banks’ behavior aimed at matching their foreign currency posi-
tions, which in effect implies that banks limit their exchange rate risk by shifting it to 
borrowers and by lending in foreign currency.   
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In the short run, DE and CE are characterized by a high degree of persistence 
that seems to prevent disequilibrium adjustment from taking place. Exchange rate and 
exchange rate volatility changes do not affect DE and CE in the short run, but infla-
tion changes do, as does banks’ behavior aimed at matching foreign currency posi-
tions.  
Threshold effects that could only be detected in more parsimonious models of 
DE and CE suggest that the adjustment of disequilibrium from previous periods is 
discrete and asymmetric. In most cases, it is faster in regimes characterized by the FE 
level being lower than suggested by the fundamentals, and slower in regimes with 
the FE level being above equilibrium values. This finding might provide an explana-
tion for the observed FE behavior not only in Croatia, but also elsewhere in the re-
gion. It took over a decade of stable economic performance for FE to very gradually 
subside, but after the unfavorable change in economic conditions in 2008 it swiftly 
shot up to its original higher levels. 
As far as policy recommendations are concerned, tackling FE in Croatia is 
quite challenging and characterized by a high degree of uncertainty. The main di-
lemma faced by policy makers is whether to go ahead with across-the-board de-euro-
ization of the financial system (ideally a symmetric one in order to avoid a build-up 
of currency mismatches) or to work toward swift euro adoption once Croatia joins 
the EU. However, the latter option is highly uncertain not only due to political and 
international economic factors, but also because Croatia is likely to have serious 
problems with fulfilling the Maastricht criteria related to fiscal deficits and public 
debt.
13 If, however, policy makers choose euro adoption, then they should accept euro-
ization as a fact and manage its risks, primarily using regulation. In the opposite case, 
if euro adoption ceases to be a viable exit option, policy makers will have to address 
very high and persistent FE.  
In order to reduce FE, Croatia and other post-transition European countries 
with high DE and CE first have to reform their macroeconomic policies and institu-
tions in order to increase their credibility. Zettelmeyer, Nagy, and Jeffrey (2010) 
suggest that dollarization in Latin American countries only began to fall after coun-
tries introduced credible macroeconomic policies based on floating exchange rate and 
inflation targeting regimes. The importance of credible macroeconomic policies is 
confirmed in post-transition Europe, where the  two countries with the  oldest and 
most established floating exchange rate and inflation targeting regimes (Poland and 
the Czech Republic) have the lowest level of FE. Although credibility of macroeco-
nomic policies and institutions was not controlled for in our empirical analysis, it is 
likely that it has to rise if policymakers want to reduce FE in Croatia.
14 Fiscal adjust-
ment will also be necessary not just in order to increase fiscal credibility and meet 
the Maastricht debt and deficit criteria, but also to make inflation targets credible 
over the longer term. 
Given that the empirical analysis results suggest that exchange rate develop-
ments and exchange rate volatility influence deposit and credit euroization in the long 
13 Public debt at the end of 2010 amounted to 45 percent of GDP. Projections based on the intertemporal 
budget constraint suggest that if no reforms of public spending are introduced, public debt could easily reach
60 percent of GDP by the end 2017, thus precluding adoption of the common currency. 
14 The eroded credibility of macroeconomic policies is obvious knowing that Croatia has a tightly managed 
float exchange rate system (which could also be defined as a quasi currency board), sustained for years be-
cause of fear of floating (Vizek, 2007).  
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run, it is essential that derivatives markets allowing borrowers to hedge against cur-
rency risk are developed. These markets would allow borrowers to hedge open for-
eign currency positions at affordable prices, thus reducing the overall sensitivity to 
exchange rate changes that promotes FE. The consequent elimination of exchange 
rate risk should matter especially for lowering borrowing in foreign currency generat-
ed by the  corporate sector. Besides developing derivatives markets, the  Croatian 
authorities should also consider further developing the local currency money market 
and promoting the local currency bond market. At the moment, the local currency 
money market is relatively shallow, while most of the  corporate and government 
bonds issued on the domestic capital market are indexed to foreign currency. 
 
APPENDIX 
Data Description and Sources 
Variable Source  Description 
Deposit euroization  Croatian National 
Bank  Share of foreign currency deposits in total deposits. 
Credit euroization  Croatian National 
Bank 
Share of foreign currency loans and loans indexed 
to a foreign currency in total loans. 




The index of the real effective exchange rate is 
a weighted geometric average of the index 
of bilateral exchange rates of the kuna adjusted for 
the relevant relative price indices. Producer price 
index is used as a deflator, (2005 = 100).  
Exchange rate  Croatian National 
Bank  Average periods nominal HRK/EUR exchange rate. 




Monthly average of daily exchange rate volatility 
given by a ratio of standard deviation and average 
daily exchange rates in four months prior to 
the observed period. 
M1 
Croatian National 
Bank  Narrow money. 
M4/M1 
Croatian National 
Bank  Ratio of M4 over M1 monetary aggregate. 
Inflation  Croatian National 
Bank  Croatian Consumer Price Index, (2005 = 100). 
Average past inflation  Croatian National 
Bank 
In each contemporaneous period calculated as 
an average of the Croatian Consumer Price Index 
(2005 = 100) two years prior to 









() + ( ) + 2(, )
var cpi cov cpi reer
var cpi var reer cov cpi reer
 
where cpi stands for Croatian Consumer Price Index 
and reer for Croatian real effective exchange rate. 
Bank foreign debt  Croatian National 
Bank  Banks’ gross external debt. 
REER cycle 
Croatian National 
Bank and Central 
Bureau of Statistics 
Correlation between real effective exchange rate 
(reer) and the business cycle represented by 
industrial production (ip) calculated as: 
Δ Δ [12-month average( ),12-month average( )] correl ip reer
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Table A1  Summary Statistics for All Variables 
  Obser-





kurtosis  Minimum Maximum 
Deposit 
euroization  161 0.79  0.08  -0.58145  -1.08497  0.65  0.88 
Exchange rate  161  7.37  0.19  -0.56038  0.02827  6.90  7.70 
REER 161  101.95  5.67  -0.26418  -0.43370  88.89  112.41 
Exchange rate 
volatility  161 0.73  0.51  1.74767 3.43891  0.06  2.77 
Inflation 161  96.28  11.75  0.07354  -0.87278  74.94  116.21 
M1 161  31041.9 14673.3  0.09799  -1.41458  11274.95  55832.98 
M4/M1 161  4.10  0.30  0.56749  0.45445  3.31  4.90 
Average past 
inflation  161 92.98  11.72  -0.01836 -0.86856  71.97  114.86 
Minimum 
variance portfolio 161 0.20  0.17  0.36107  -0.00834  -0.27  0.63 
REER cycle  161  -0.10  0.27  0.11923  -0.16704  -0.77  0.56 
Credit 
euroization   43  0.753  0.077  -0.35290  -0.82092  0.608  0.86 
Bank foreign 
debt   43  6446.33 3201.34  -0.23897  -1.67814  2035.22  10724.16 
 
Table A2  Critical Values of F Statistics Used for Testing TAR and M-TAR Threshold 
Cointegration (Null Hypothesis  1 ρ = 2 ρ =0) with The Unknown Threshold  
2-variable case  5-variable case 
1 lag  4 lags  4 lags 
Number of 
observations 
0.90 0.95 0.99 0.90 0.95 0.99 0.90 0.95 0.99 
TAR 
   50  6.35  7.54  10.29  5.83  6.98  9.56  8.10   9.46  12.54 
100  5.95 6.99 9.39 5.66 6.66 8.97 8.50   9.73  12.43 
150 5.94  6.98  9.29  5.78 6.76 8.93 8.77  10.02  12.73 
200  6.03 7.05 9.35 5.89 6.88 9.05 9.17  10.40  13.06 
250  6.14 7.11 9.38 6.07 7.08 9.32 9.34  10.57  13.20 
500  6.41 7.39 9.66 6.38 740 9.63 9.78  11.05  13.67 
M-TAR 
   50  7.22  8.49  11.55  6.54  7.76  10.50   8.90  10.26  13.44 
100  6.97 8.15  10.67  6.61 7.73  10.14    9.52  10.81  13.72 
150  6.75 7.87  10.40  6.54 7.62 9.96  9.66  10.99  13.74 
200  6.62 7.72  10.04  6.46 7.51 9.85   9.75  11.05  13.83 
250  6.61 7.76  10.15  6.41 7.44 9.71   9.84  11.12  13.82 
500  6.52 7.55 9.93 6.42 7.47 9.72  10.05  11.31  14.07  
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Table A3  Threshold Cointegration 
Deposit euroization  
with real effective exchange rate 
Credit euroization  
with nominal exchange rate 
TAR M-TAR  TAR 
Model 
Threshold = 0.0081  Threshold = 0.0055 Threshold = -0.0126 
ρ1=  -0.15 -0.0054 -0.297 
ρ2 =    -0.059            -0.13  -0.535 
Tmax -1.12  -0.067  -1.84 
Φρ ρ == 12 0 ()   5.50 5.51 5.16 
ρ ρ = 12 W( )  0.67 [0.44]  1.03 [0.18]  0.85 [0.36] 
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